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TAXATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES:
SOME RECENT SUPPORT AND CHALLENGES
TO THE CONVENTIONAL VIEW
Reuven Avi-Yonah* and Yoram Margalioth*
The general advice given by international institutions such as the
InternationalMonetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank to developing
countries over the past few decades has been to replace trade taxes with
domestic consumption taxes, particularlyvalue-added taxes (VAT), and
to maintain relatively high corporate income tax rates. This article
reviews recent literaturethat supports and challenges this conventional
view.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The seminal work on the subject of taxation and development was
done by Burgess and Stern, who reviewed previous literature and
presented what is still, thirteen years later, regarded as one of the
most important works in the field.'
According to their view, developing countries should have an
indirect tax system based on the following elements:
(i) a VAT with one or two rates and some exemptions; (ii)
excises on alcohol, tobacco, petroleum products, and some
luxury goods; and (iii) direct support for certain groups,
possibly through subsidized rations.... [Such a system] may
be supplemented by temporary tariffs to maintain revenue or
where infant industry arguments have genuine empirical
support .... 2
Burgess and Stern strongly support the now common movement away
from trade taxes to sales tax in general, and to value-added taxes
(VAT) in particular.3
The role of direct taxation in developing countries is much more
limited. In contrast to developed countries where taxation on personal
income and social security contributions raises two-thirds of the total
tax revenue, a narrow tax base and high enforcement
costs in
•
•
4
developing countries render direct taxation impractical. The income
tax base in developing countries is mostly comprised of the wages of
public sector employees because most other taxpayers are selfemployed or small businesses who evade paying all, or most, of the
income tax.' In addition, taxation of personal capital income is easily
6
evaded.
Taxing the income of corporations, on the other hand, provides
developing countries with a large portion of their total tax revenue
(estimated in 1993 to be close to one-third), compared• to
only a small
7
portion (less than one-tenth) in developed countries. Taxing large
Robin Burgess & Nicholas Stern, Taxation and Development, 31 J. ECON. LIT.
762 (1993).
2 Id. at 821.
3 Id.

4 See id. at 819-20.
5 See id. at 799.
6

Id.

7 Id. at 773 tbl.5, 777.
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corporations does not involve significant administrative and
compliance costs because the companies are already forced to comply

with statutory accounting requirements."
Following this conventional wisdom, the general advice given to
developing countries over the past few decades by international
institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the
World Bank has been to replace trade taxes with domestic
consumption taxes, particularly VATs, 9 and to maintain relatively

high corporate income tax rates.10
Some recent literature challenges this conventional view, arguing
that the relatively large informal sector in developing countries may
justify a different tax policy design." In a previous article, Margalioth

suggests that maintaining high corporate income tax rates may come
at a high cost in terms of economic growth as corporate tax rates
affect foreign direct investment (FDI) location, and may cause
significant spillover effects."'
This article is structured as follows. Part II provides some general
background information. Part III reviews some recent papers that
support the conventional wisdom. Part IV reviews some recent
criticisms of the conventional wisdom. Finally, Part V draws upon this
body of recent research to raise a few questions and offer suggestions

for future study.

8 Id. at 777.

9 See M. Shahe Emran & Joseph E. Stiglitz, On Selective Indirect Tax Reform in
Developing Countries, 89 J. PUB. ECON. 599, 599-600 (2005). Emran and Stiglitz state:
A reduction in the trade tax with a compensating or revenue-enhancing
increase in value-added tax (henceforth VAT) has been the center-piece of
such a reform, and it has been implemented in a large number of
developing countries under the structural adjustment and stabilization
policy conditionalities of the IMF and the World Bank.
Id.
10 See, e.g., Alex Easson, Tax Incentives for Foreign Direct Investment Part 1:

Recent Trends and Countertrends,55 BULL. FOR INT'L FISCAL DOCUMENTATION 266,
266 (2001).
" See Emran & Stiglitz, supra note 9, at 599; see also Roger Gordon & Wei Li,
Tax Structure in Developing Countries: Many Puzzles and a Possible Explanation
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11267, 2005).
12 Yoram Margalioth, Tax Competition, Foreign DirectInvestments, and Growth:
Using the Tax System to Promote Developing Countries, 23 VA. TAX REV. 161, 188
(2003).
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II. BACKGROUND
Taxes are necessary to overcome the free riding inherent in the
financing of public goods, to control market imperfections, and to
achieve social justice through redistribution. Economic growth
(efficiency) is promoted by the first set of goals, whereas social justice
(equity) is promoted by redistribution and the provision of public and
merit goods, most notably health and education.
Literature on the subject generally assumes that the goals of
promoting economic growth and social justice are shared by
developed and developing countries; however, a number of major
differences between developed and developing countries may call for
different tax designs. These differences include variations in industry
type (primarily the relatively high shares of agricultural and small
businesses in developing countries), in the size of administrative and
compliance costs, in the levels of corruption, in the levels of
monetization in the economy, in political constraints, and in the
relative size of the informal economy.
The overall proportion of government expenditure of the gross
domestic product (GDP) is higher in developed than developing
countries.13 This situation is not necessarily optimal, because a greater
need exists for government intervention in developing countries (e.g.,
for building infrastructure and education) than in developed
countries. On the other hand, the costs of corruption, administration,
and compliance are much greater in developing countries, making the
outcome of this trade-off unclear.
The portion of total revenue comprised of non-tax revenue is, on
14
average, larger for developing countries than developed countries.
revenue in developing
Nevertheless, the main source of government
15
countries, taken as a whole, is the tax system.
The structure of taxation in developing countries is radically
different from the structure of taxation in developed countries. About
two-thirds of the tax revenue in developed countries is obtained from
direct taxes, mostly personal income tax and social security

13 Government expenditure of the gross domestic product (GDP) is 31.5% in

developed countries, as opposed to 25.4% in developing countries. Burgess & Stern,
supra note 1, at 765.
14 Non-tax revenue in developing countries comprised about 21% of GDP
compared to 10% in developed countries. These are aggregate figures and substantial
variation exists across countries. Id. at 782.
is Id. at 770.
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• 16
contributions.
The remaining one-third comes primarily from the
domestic sales tax.' 7 The situation is exactly reversed in developing
countries, in which about two-thirds of the tax revenue comes from
indirect taxes.' These indirect taxes include the VAT, the sales tax,
and excises and taxes on trade. '9 The remaining one-third comes
primarily from the corporate income tax.2
Since the 1980s, developing countries have undergone frequent
tax reforms, gradually replacing trade taxes with domestic
consumption taxes, particularly the VAT.2' These reforms were part
of two world-wide trends that affected developed countries as well.
The first trend was economic liberalization and adherence to the
World Trade Organization (WTO) requirements, which called for the
elimination of all barriers to free trade. 2 The second trend was the
23
rapidly increasing popularity of the VAT all over the world.
The purpose of replacing trade taxes with domestic consumption
taxes was principally to improve macroeconomic stability and to
24
introduce the benefits of free trade to developing economies. Export
taxes are seen as inefficient because they put the local producers who
export their goods at a disadvantage compared with foreign
producers. The VAT was viewed as more efficient than import taxes
because it does not discriminate between domestic and imported
goods. By eliminating import taxes, local consumers benefit from the

,6 Id. at 772 tbl.4, 773 tbl.5, 775.
17 Id.
18
19
20

Id.
Id.
Id. "[T]here appears to be a pattern of evolution of tax structure [in

developing countries]." Norman Gemmell & Oliver Morrissey, Tax Structure and the
Incidence on the Poor in Developing Countries 5 (Centre for Res. in Econ. Dev. and
Int'l Trade, Univ. of Nottingham, No. 03/18, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=503101. "At low levels of income, trade taxes are relatively important and
income taxes relatively less important." Id. (citation omitted). A shift occurs, from
trade to domestic sales taxes, as income increases. "As incomes rise again, trade taxes
become unimportant and various income taxes become most important. These
averages, however, conceal wide disparities between countries." Id.
21 See Emran & Stiglitz, supra
note 9.
22 See, e.g., The WTO in Brief, http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatis-e/
inbriefe/inbr00_e.htm.
23 See Richard M. Bird, Value-Added Taxes in Developing and Transitional
Countries: Lessons and Questions (Joseph L. Rotman Sch. of Mgmt., Univ. of
Toronto, ITP Paper 0505, 2005), available at http://www.rotman.utoronto.ca/iib/
ITP0505.pdf.
24 See Emran & Stiglitz, supra note 9, at
600.
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lower prices created by the competition between domestic and foreign
producers.2' Additionally, eliminating import taxes forces local
producers to become more efficient and concentrate their efforts on
their comparative advantage. 26
Equity considerations, namely reducing poverty and inequality,
have been of secondary importance, when considered at all, in the tax
reforms of developing countries. Focusing only on efficiency can
result in the adoption of regressive tax policies.27 For example, taxes
on goods with low price elasticities of demand, such as some cereals
and domestic fuel, are efficient in that they do not distort behavior.2
However, since the poor consume these goods disproportionately,
equity considerations
weigh against the adoption of such
S• 29 will
regressive tax policies.
III. RECENT LITERATURE SUPPORTING THE CONVENTIONAL
WISDOM

Gemmell and Morrissey have analyzed the distributional impact
of tax reforms in developing countries.30 They conclude that "[t]he
available evidence suggests that sales taxes are slightly more
progressive, or less regressive, than taxes on imports."'" Additionally,
Gemmell and Morrissey have found that, in most developing
countries, "export taxes were regressive, typically incident on
smallholder agricultural producers (who, if not actually poor, were
relatively low income). The removal of such taxes, combined with the
reduction of other implicit taxes on agriculture, should have had a
favourable impact on distribution and the poor.''32 As a result,
Gemmell and Morrissey conclude further that "it seems likely that the
reforms will not have worsened the effects of the tax structure on
distribution and the poor."33
Gemmell and Morrissey add to the conventional wisdom an

25

See id. at 600.

26 The theory of comparative advantage was first introduced by David
Ricardo.
See DAVID RICARDO, ON THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION

(3d ed. 1821), available at http://www.econlib.org/library/Ricardo/ricP.html.
27 Gemmell & Morrissey, supra note 20.
28

Id.

29

Id. at 22.

30 Id.
31
32

33

Id. at abstract.
Id. at 29.
Id. at abstract.
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emphasis on the distributive effects of consumption taxes. They argue
that no conclusive evidence exists "regarding the impact of generally
replacing tariffs with sales taxes, largely because we do not know
enough about economic incidence and the implications of a large
informal sector," such as those prevalent in developing countries.34
They cite the example of excise taxes on fuel as a particularly
troublesome manifestation of this problem." Gemmell and Morrissey
assert that a tax on kerosene (or paraffin) may have high social costs36:
Kerosene (or paraffin) is often important within poor
household[s, where it is used for heating, lighting, and
cooking] but is not widely used by the rich. Thus, not only will
kerosene taxes be harmful to the poor, but [kerosene can be
exempted] from more general fuel taxes to improve equity
without encouraging inefficient substitutions between fuel
types.37
On the other hand, it is not entirely clear that taxing gas for cars has a
low social cost." Gemmell and Morrissey argue that "taxes on
intermediates such as fuel are often thought to be regressive because
they affect transport costs (thus increasing prices of goods consumed
by the poor)."39 They suggest that "[t]he important implication for tax
policy is that, on distribution and poverty grounds, taxes on goods that
are most important in the
consumption bundles of the poor should be
40
kept as low as possible.,
The distributive consequences of conventional reliance on
consumption taxes may seem especially grim when considering Latin
America in general, especially Central America, where poverty and
inequality rates are exceptionally high. 4 ' Bird acknowledges such
inequality is "[t]he central social and economic problem in many Latin
American countries. 4 ' He argues, however, that this is primarily a
3A

Id. at 29.

35 Id.
36

Id. at 22.

Id. at 27-28.
Id. at 29.
39 Id. at 28.
40 Id. at
29.
41 Richard M. Bird, Taxation in Latin America: Reflections on Sustainability
and
the Balance between Equity and Efficiency 7 (Joseph L. Rotman Sch. of Mgmt., Univ.
of Toronto, ITP Paper 0306, 2003), available at http://ideas.repec.org/p/ttp/itpwps/
0306.htmi.
42 Id. at
44.
37
38
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political problem.4 3 The rich elite in Latin America have a great deal
of political power, but they refuse to reduce inequality." Bird notes
that a positive correlation exists between inequality in Latin America
and the extremely unequal distribution of land ownership. 45 He
therefore suggests increasing the very low property tax rates now in
force and improving tax administration through "more comprehensive
coverage, better assessments, more frequent assessment revaluations,
and enforced penalties for late payment."46
Bird goes on to advocate "[rieforms that link taxes and benefits
more tightly... , such as decentralization and more reliance on user
charges.,47 He argues that, "contrary to popular rhetoric, most user
charges are progressive in their incidence. The property tax, and some
local business taxation, may be considered to be 'generalized user
charges' if properly designed and implemented."' 4"
In addition, Bird argues that pro-poor spending programs are
more effective in reducing poverty than the tax system. Nonetheless,
at the same time, it is important to "untax" the poor by "setting higher
thresholds for certain taxes or charges (e.g. lifeline [utilities]) or
granting certain exemptions from the VAT."49
In addition to taxing land, Bird suggests imposing taxes on
estates. Imposing a wealth tax on the top 1-2% of society, even if
badly administered, "may sometimes be worthwhile not only in
symbolic but also in actual terms."' 0 For example, a 1% annual wealth
tax for property yielding a 5% average annual return has the same
effect as taxing that return at 20%."
Bird supports the conventional view of tax reform in developing
countries by stressing that, despite the extreme inequality in Latin
43 See, e.g., id.
44 Id. at 41; see also Richard M. Bird, Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Benno
Torgler,

Societal Institutions and Tax Effort in Developing Countries 13-14 (Joseph L. Rotman
Sch. of Mgmt., Univ. of Toronto, ITP Paper 04011, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=662081 (describing Latin America as a region in which the combination of
the dominant policy ideas and the dominant economic and social interests combine
with the key political and economic institutions (democracy, decentralization, and
budgetary; and free trade, protectionism, macroeconomic policy, and market
structure) to produce a generally low tax level and an uneven tax structure).
41 See Bird, supra note 41, at 40.
46 Id.

41 Id.at 43.
48 Id.at 43 n.58.
41 Id.at 43.
so Id.
51 Id.
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America countries, "the best tax system [for them] is the one that
52
produces the most revenue in the least costly and distorting way.
Such a system is "[a] broad-based VAT, and not a steeply progressive
income tax."53 Bird does note, however, that this system should be
supplemented with taxes on land and other property, good user
charges, and taxes on motor vehicles and fuel.54
These ideas are further developed by Bird and Zolt.55 Bird and
Zolt stress that, in developing countries, expenditure policy is much
more important for redistribution purposes than income tax policy
and consumption taxes can be progressive and should be
supplemented with user charges. They further emphasize that
"[g]reater fiscal decentralization (moving tax and expenditure
authority to lower levels of governments) may allow for better
matching of those who benefit and those who pay for government
activity," Bird and Zolt then add a series of suggestions on methods to
improve income tax enforcement.56 In addition to the standard
administrative advice detailed below, they suggest greater reliance on
presumptive taxation and the adoption of the Nordic dual income tax
system.57 They also propose that "[t]ax authorities could try to
increase the number and types of individuals subject to withholding
[taxes] on labor income, for example, by expanding the definition of
employee for tax purposes beyond [that required by] employment
law."5 8
Bird and Zolt further recommend "heavier reliance on
withholding (for example, by banks) and [on] third-party
information." 9 Taxpayers who fail to withhold or report information
on payments they have made should not be allowed to deduct those
payments for income tax purposes. Bird and Zolt describe a range of
options for tax authorities, including "using taxpayer identification

numbers, outsourcing routine data processing, adopting case-tracking
systems, and improving and expanding audit systems."6
52

Id. at 47.

53 Id.
54 Id.

Richard M. Bird & Eric M. Zolt, Rethinking Redistribution: Tax Policy
in an
Era of Rising Inequality: Redistribution via Taxation: The Limited Role of the Personal
Income Tax in Developing Countries, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1627 (2005).
56 Id. at 1630.
57 Id. at 1688-90.
58 Id. at 1683.
59 Id. at 1684.
55

60 Id.
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Bird and Zolt contend that the use of presumptive taxes "is
surprisingly widespread in taxation around the world, though [such
taxes appear] under many names."6 Taxable income is estimated by
the authorities on the basis of "coefficients for different factors
applied to specific taxpayers, specific types of taxpayers [for example,
the location as well as the number of chairs in a restaurant], or in
some cases on more aggregate indicators, such as industry and region,
or external indicators of income., 62 The authors indicate that "[s]uch
taxes are intended to capture at least some minimum level of tax from63
entities, regardless of either their reported or their true net income.,
Usually, the taxpayer is allowed to rebut the presumption by proving
his or her true income.
A dual income tax system imposes a flat tax on income from
capital. In developing countries, this has the advantage of including in
the tax base capital income that was previously exempt, and
improving enforcement and compliance by allowing the fixed
withholding tax rate to be the final tax. 64
The income tax proposed by Bird and Zolt is designed to be
modest reform (justified in whole or in part on symbolic grounds)
designed to complement "a broad-based VAT, appropriate excise
taxes, more use of local and65 benefit financing, and above all, an
improved expenditure policy.
IV. RECENT LITERATURE CRITICIZING THE CONVENTIONAL
WISDOM

In a 2005 article, Emran and Stiglitz challenged "the current
consensus that favors a reduction and eventual elimination of trade
taxes, and almost exclusively relies on VAT as the instrument of
indirect taxation in developing countries." 66 In their 2005 article, they
argue that the consensus "isbuilt on fragile results derived from a
6
partial model that ignores the existence of an informal sector.", 1
Instead, they contend that "the results from a more complete model
demonstrate[] [that replacing trade taxes with VAT] can reduce

61

Id. at 1685.

62 Id.
63

Id. at 1686.

64 Id. at 1690.
65

Id. at 1695.

66 Emran & Stiglitz, supra note 9, at 618.
67

Id. at 602.
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welfare under plausible assumptions" 8 and conclude that "[t]he
results raise serious doubts about the wisdom of the indirect tax
69
reform policies pursued by a large number of developing countries.
In an earlier version of the article, Emran and Stiglitz asserted
"that while a radial (across the board) uniform reduction in trade
taxes reduces the production distortions and the distortions between
tradable and nontradable sectors, a revenue-neutral radial increase in
VAT increases the inter-sectoral distortions between formal and
informal sectors., 70 That is, goods may be produced and sold in both
the formal and informal sectors, but the consumption tax is only paid
by the formal sector and creates a distortion between formal and
informal sectors, resulting in a potential reduction in aggregate
welfare.
In their 2005 article, Emran and Stiglitz "extend[ed their] analysis
to the case of a selective reform of trade tax and VAT in an economy
with an informal sector."7 1 The term selective reform refers to tax
changes that apply only to a subset of the commodities falling under
the tax net.72 In such a context, they state:
Michael et al.... show that, in a tradables-only economy with
no informal sector, a reduction in the import tariff on the
commodity bearing the highest tariff and also the highest
total indirect tax burden increases welfare under suitable
assumptions of substitutability, when the lost revenue is
compensated for by an increase in the consumption tax on the
commodity bearing the lowest indirect tax burden. 3
In their view, however, "[t]he extant literature.., completely
ignores the implications of an informal economy for the efficiency of
consumption tax (VAT) as an instrument of revenue-raising,
which
74
countries.
developing
the
in
important
especially
can be
According to Emran and Stiglitz, for the existing results on

68

69

Id.
Id. at abstract.

70 Id. at 600 (describing M.S. Emran & J.E. Stiglitz, VAT Versus Trade Taxes:

The (In)efficiency of Indirect Tax Reform in Developing Countries (mimeo, Stanford
Univ. & Brookings Inst., Washington, D.C., 2000)).
71
72

Id.
See id. at 600 & n.4.

71 Id. at 602 (citing M. Michael et al., Integrated Reforms of Tariffs and
Consumption Taxes, 52 J. PUB. ECON. 417 (1993)).
74

Id.

12
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"revenue-neutral selective reform of tariffs and consumption taxes" to
be valid and applicable, it is necessary to make the assumption "that it
is feasible to impose and collect consumption tax (VAT) on the
commodity bearing the lowest indirect tax on consumption. 7 ' This
assumption is problematic, for "[w]hile [it] is automatically satisfied
when an economy consists of only the formal sector, it is not a
plausible assumption in the presence of a large informal76 segment in
the economy that, by definition, escapes VAT coverage.,
Instead, they assert that "[i]n an economy with both formal and
informal sectors, the best one can do is to select the commodity
enjoying the lowest indirect tax burden among the subset of formal
commodities as the candidate for VAT increase. 77 In light of this
restriction, they then prove "that there are plausible (sufficient)
conditions under which such a selective reform of VAT and import
tariff reduces welfare. 7 8 They also provide plausible, sufficient
conditions for "worsening of welfare from a reduction
in import tariff
79
with a revenue-neutral VAT base broadening.,
Emran and Stiglitz also criticize the fact that "the extant literature
exclusively deals with the coordinated reform of import tariffs and
consumption taxes, and ignores the case of a coordinated reform of
export taxes and consumption taxes, although such reforms are
frequently prescribed by the policy advisors." 80 They argue:
Our results on export tax reform in the absence of an
informal sector show that the conditions required for a
welfare improvement from the reduction in export tax on one
commodity combined with a revenue neutral increase in VAT
on another are much more stringent than the case of an
import tariff reform. Unlike the case of an import tariff
reform, the selective revenue-neutral reform of VAT and
export tax can reduce welfare in an economy without an
informal sector, even when all commodities are...
substitutable. The results of this paper thus complement and
strengthen the conclusions reached by [our earlier article].8'

75 Id.
76

Id.

77

Id.
Id.

78

79 Id.
80 Id.

81 Id. at 602 (footnote omitted).
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In addition, Emran and Stiglitz argue that "trade taxes enjoy a
clear advantage over VAT" due to administrative costs, which is "the
usual explanation for the pervasive use of trade taxes in early stages of
development. 8 2 This primarily stems from the fact that "[t]he
informational and compliance costs of VAT are likely to be high,
especially in developing countries, because of high rates of illiteracy
and scant written record-keeping...
Lastly, they argue that trade taxes are not more vulnerable to
smuggling than VAT. They assert that:
[A]n increase in import taxes increases the returns to both
domestic production and smuggling, so that the extent of
smuggling is constrained by the higher domestic supply of a
commodity. A higher VAT, on the other hand, increases the
consumer price but leaves the returns to the domestic
producers unchanged. This implies a higher return to
smuggling relative to domestic production, assuming that the
commodity in question is an importable. 4
Other authors have also questioned the wisdom of eliminating
trade taxes. Baunsgaard and Keen analyzed panel data for 111
countries over 25 years - from 1975 to 2000.5 They show that
developing countries find it very difficult to replace the revenue lost
by trade liberalization with revenue from domestic sources. This
reality is especially troubling since "revenue recovery has been
extremely weak in low-income countries (which are those most
dependent on trade tax revenues)."8 6 These countries have recovered,
at best, no more than about 30 cents of each lost dollar. 7 Moreover
the presence of a VAT has not in itself made it easier to cope with the
revenue effects of trade liberalization.""
Baunsgaard and Keen seem to present another challenge to the
conventional wisdom that eliminating trade taxes is necessarily good.
They also argue, however, that "it is perfectly possible for trade
reform to be socially beneficial even when accompanied by a
82 Id. at 620 (citation omitted).
83

Id.

Id. at 621.
Thomas Baunsgaard & Michael Keen, Tax Revenue and (or?) Trade
Liberalization(Int'l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 50/112, 2005).
ld.
I8
87 Id. at 14.
84
85

89 Id.
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reduction in total revenue ... ,,89 There is no support for this
argument in their paper, though, as the paper focuses on income, not
welfare measurement, and there is no explanation as to why Emran
and Stiglitz, who reach the opposite conclusion, 90 may be wrong.
Two other authors, Gordon and Li, criticize the conventional
wisdom indirectly by suggesting a rationale for the distinct structure of
tax systems in developing countries that is fundamentally different
from the rationale offered by the IMF and World Bank staff. 9'
Gordon and Li describe the characteristics of the tax systems in
developing countries in the following way:
[R]evenue/GDP is surprisingly small compared with that in
developed economies. Taxes on labor income play a minor
role. Taxes on consumption are important, but effective tax
rates vary dramatically by firm, with many firms avoiding
taxes entirely by operating through cash in the informal
92
economy and others facing very high liabilities.
In this model, corporate tax is also significant, as are tariffs and
seignorage (printing money). 93 This description runs counter to
mainstream theoretical literature analyzing tax policy in developed
countries. 94
The description suggests that all of these aspects of policy (high
corporate tax rates, tariffs, and seignorage) may be explained as a
reaction to major tax enforcement difficulties.9 The key assumption in
this theory is that firms in developing countries can evade taxes
completely "by shifting entirely to cash transactions and not using the
financial sector ...*,96
Gordon and Li's model provides that:
When firms make use of the financial sector.., the
government can gain access to their bank records and use this
information in enforcing the tax law. Firms then have to
choose whether the economic benefits from use of the
89 Id. at 3.
90 Emran & Stiglitz, supra note 9, at 600.
91

Gordon & Li, supra note 11.

92

Id. at abstract.
Id. at 2.

93
94

Id.
95 Id. at 3.
96

Id.
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financial sector are greater or less than the resulting tax
liabilities. Poorer countries differ from richer countries under
[this] hypothesis simply because the value firms receive from
using the financial sector is much more modest. When the
value from using the financial sector is low, the government
needs to worry about possible disintermediation and the
resulting loss of its tax base when choosing its tax structure.
This threat of disintermediation not only can keep tax rates
low, but can also have important effects on the design of the
tax structure, and on government policies more generally. 97
Taxes can most easily be collected from the firms most dependent
on the financial sector, presumably capital-intensive firms.98 Gordon
and Li state that "[rIelying more heavily on corporate income taxes is
one means of focusing tax collection on the firms that are most
dependent on the financial sector." 99
Given the resulting differential tax rates by sector, other policies
would sensibly be used to offset these tax distortions. Tariff protection
for capital-intensive firms makes sense since the government wishes to
protect its tax base.1'0 Another policy is inflation, which is relatively
prevalent in developing countries and enhanced by seignorage. Firms
that use the financial sector are largely protected from inflation, since
in equilibrium their bank deposits should earn a higher nominal
interest rate, reflecting expected inflation, whereas those firms that
rely on cash transactions so as to evade tax are thereby vulnerable to
inflation.01
Gordon and Li argue that "[p]olicies may sensibly encourage or
hinder investments by multinationals, depending on the government's
ability to tax multinationals vs. competing domestic firms. There may
even be an efficiency gain from introducing red tape hindering activity
97 Id. at 3-4.
98

Id.

99 Id.

Id.
'o' Id. Gordon and Li state:
100

The optimal inflation tax is limited, though, by the possibility that dollars or
some other foreign currency replace the local currency, in order to avoid
the inflation tax. Since this currency substitution provides no further shift in
resources towards the taxed sector but leads to a discrete fall in seignorage
revenue, the optimal inflation rate is capped due to this treat of currency
substitution.
Id. at 21.
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in the untaxed sector."' 2
In the tax scheme proposed by Gordon and Li, the financial
03
sector has an essential role in ensuring a functioning tax structure.'
The government must be able to act to ensure access to bank records
on each firm in order to use this information in enforcing the tax
law.'°4 Gordon and Li contend that "[s]tate ownership of the banks is
one extreme policy that can in principle assure that banks make
information available to the government. Another approach is use of
bank regulations, whereby any bank that refuses to cooperate with the
tax authorities loses its license to function as a bank."'05 Entry of
foreign banks will be particularly discouraged in this model, given the
ease with which foreign banks can facilitate tax evasion by domestic
firms.1°6
The policy implications of accepting the hypothesis suggested by
Gordon and Li are quitea• different
from those offered by the
•107
conventional wisdom analysis.
For example, reducing tariffs or
inflation may not be optimal, as doing so would reduce tax revenue.
The key policy focus in this model would be reform of the domestic
financial sector. 1°8 This system provides that:
Any policies that raise the value of the services provided by
financial intermediaries will increase the usage of the
financial sector, raising efficiency and allowing the
government to collect more revenue. Conversely, anything
that undercuts the perceived value of the services provided by
the financial sector, e.g. a bank failure, can undermine the
fraction of GDP collected in tax revenue, in addition to any
direct effects on GDP through loss of financial
intermediation.19

102
103

Id. at 4.
Id. at 26.

104 Id.
105

Id. at 26.

Id. at 27.
107 Compare id. (suggesting the imposition of
tariffs, printing money, stateownership of banks, discouraging entrance of foreign banks thereby limiting the
competition in the banking sector, and introducing red tape in certain sectors of the
economy), with Burgess & Stern, supra note 1 (suggesting a switch from relying on
tariffs to general consumption taxes, preferably VAT, avoiding money printing,
eliminating red tape, and increasing competition).
108Gordon & Li, supra note
11.
109Id. at 30.
106
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The conventional wisdom's reliance on corporate taxes was
challenged in a recent article by Margalioth that builds on the
conventional wisdom's emphasis on the optimality of consumption
taxes in developing countries but criticizes its reliance on corporate
income tax."" Margalioth argues that developing countries should
adopt policies that attract foreign direct investment (FDI)."' Case
studies suggest that substantial technological diffusion takes place in
theories,
domestically-owned firms, and, according to new growth
2
growth.'
economic
of
engine
the
such spillover effects are
He also argues that as former FDI barriers, like tariffs, currency
exchange controls, and the costs of spreading production processes
over multiple countries, are reduced or gone, taxes became a more
decisive factor, hence offering tax incentives or having a uniform low
corporate tax rate may be an effective policy to attract FDI."3
Margalioth suggests that:
[T]ax incentives, like any other market intervention, are
justified if they correct market inefficiencies or generate
positive externalities.... FDI generates positive externalities
in the form of productivity spillovers. As with any positive
externality, the amount of FDI absent government
investors
intervention is socially sub-optimal because foreign
4
investments.'
their
of
gains
full
the
capture
cannot
He describes tax incentives as:
[T]ax provisions that deviate from baseline provisions. If the
baseline is the standard international or regional tax rate, or
even the individual tax rate, then a low corporate tax rate
qualifies as a 'tax incentive.' If the motivation behind the low
tax rate is attracting investments, then it is even more
appropriate to classify it as a tax incentive. If the baseline is
the corporate tax itself, then a low corporate tax rate [that
does not distinguish between foreign and domestic investors]

110Margalioth, supra note 12, at 169; see also Burgess & Stern, supra note 1, at
821 (predicting that developing countries would not change their reliance on
corporate taxation).
.. Margalioth, supra note 12, at 168-69.
112 Id. at 167, 177.
"3 Id. at 183.
14

Id. at 184-85.

18
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is not an incentive since by definition tax incentives are
targeted at specific types of investors or investments.15
He goes on to argue that targeted tax incentives are much more
powerful and cost effective policy tools than low across-the-board
corporate income tax rates, at least where policymakers know what
types of investments involve the greatest positive spillovers at the
lowest administrative CoSt. 116 Therefore, policymakers might prefer to
identify good potential investments on a case-by-case basis. 17
Margalioth points out that there are, however, many
disadvantages to such a regime. First, it is harder to make potential
investors aware of this type of incentive. Case-by-case review works
best with large investments where investors are more likely to shop
around. Second, the advantage over the general tax incentives
mentioned above is limited. There is no guarantee policymakers can
correctly assess potential spillovers, even when they are examining a
specific investment. The most acute disadvantage of discretionary tax
incentives, especially in developing countries, is that they are
susceptible to corruption. In many countries, discretionary application
of tax incentives
is one of the most important contributors to
18
corruption.
Margalioth maintains that a general corporate income tax rate
reduction is a viable possibility to attract growth-promoting FDI."9 By
far the most troubling aspect of using tax incentives or a low corporate
tax rate to attract FDI is surrendering the ability to impose corporate
income tax on domestic taxpayers. This frequently is a consequence of
tax incentives because limiting tax incentives to foreign investors is
administratively infeasible.2
115Id. at 187.
16

Id. Margalioth states:

We generally assume that plant and equipment investments in medium and
high tech industries promote growth. Various tax code provisions, such as
faster-than-economic cost recovery, investment allowances and tax credits
attract these desirable investments. Tax incentives for increasing
investment in human capital range from allowing taxpayers to deduct or
expense education and training costs to providing employers with tax
credits for the same.
Id. (footnote omitted).
"' Id. at 188.
118

Id.

119

Id.

120

Id. at 190. "Of course, extending benefits to domestic corporate taxpayers

Taxation in Developing Countries

2007]

However, he notes that losing the ability to impose regular
corporate income tax rates on domestic taxpayers might not be too
harmful, for the following reason. Shifting from an income to a21
consumption tax usually is considered efficient but regressive.1
However, as is now the conventional wisdom (which was not that
clear at the time the paper was written), consumption taxes are not
necessarily regressive. The regressivity is offsetable through a more
progressive use of the tax revenue generated from other sources,
122
mostly through the expenditure side of the national budget.
in tax incidences
S• 123
Another consideration is the potential difference
between developed and developing countries. Margalioth notes that
according to Shah and Whalley, the incidence of corporate income tax
in developing countries makes it somewhat regressive. 124 Replacing a
regressive corporate income tax with greater reliance on a regressive
consumption tax probably adds little, if any, to the overall regressivity
of the tax system - even without adjusting the expenditure side of the
budget. Hence, a shift to a consumption tax is justified if the1 tax
2
incentives attract FDI that results in growth-promoting spillovers.
Margalioth further suggests that developed countries should
replace some of their foreign direct aid with an equity-based tax
expenditure policy.116 They should allow residents who invest in
developing countries to fully benefit from the tax incentives offered
by exempting or otherwise sparing this foreign income."' His proposal
transfers revenue from the treasuries of developed countries to
countries, but it does so indirectly and with targeted
developing
128
money. It is equivalent to giving the governments of developing
countries money that can be used only to attract FDI.129 The
underlying assumption is that governments of developing countries

may be desirable so that they are not at a competitive disadvantage relative to the
FDI in local markets. Tax incentives also help place domestic corporations in a
position to absorb spillovers with respect to export activity." Id.
121 Id.
122

Id. at 191.

123

Id.

124

Id. (citing Anwar Shah & John Whalley, The Redistributive Impact of

Taxation in Developing Countries, in

TAX POLICY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

172 (Javad Khalilzadeh-Shirazi & Anwar Shah eds., 1991)).
125 Id.
126

Id. at 201.

127

Id.

128
129

Id. at 201-02.
Id. at 202.

166,
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lack the capacity to run large industrial and commercial enterprises, so
promoting growth through multinationals' activity is more efficient. 30
According to Margalioth, these revenue transfers would increase
if limits were placed on the ability of rich countries,
•• 131 such as Ireland, to
engage in tax competition with poor countries. He argues that a
special form of tax harmonization with a sharp division based on perequity
capita GDP is justified as part of an international vertical
2
regime for transferring wealth to developing countries.
Margalioth concludes that since developing countries may also
engage in harmful tax competition, we can apply similar anti-tax
competition rules to them. 33 This leads to the establishment of two
different harmonized tax levels, one for developed countries and the
other for developing countries.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE
RESEARCH

The Washington Consensus, articulated in 1990, was meant to
synthesize the reforms that most economists in the World Bank, the
IMF, the U.S. Treasury, and some of Washington's think tanks
believed were necessary for sustained economic growth. The
experience of the last two decades has proved the Consensus wrong.131
There is no reason to think that things are different in the tax
arena. Common sense advice, based on the experience of advisers
educated in developed countries, may not necessarily make sense in
any specific developing country. A good tax system is one that fits
both the social institutions as well as other specific determinants of
distribution and economic growth in each country. Searching for one
optimal tax system for countries grouped together by a definition
based on GDP per capita is problematic. The vast differences, for
example, between Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, China, and
India, should make it impossible to design a generalized tax system, or
even to offer useful guidelines, unless we first study each country
separately. Therefore, our initial suggestion for future research is the
130

Id.

131 Id.
132

Id.

133

Id.

134 Id.

135 See, e.g., Dani Rodrik, Goodbye Washington Consensus, Hello Washington

Confusion?: A Review of the World Bank's Economic Growth in the 1990's: Learning
from a Decade of Reform, 44 J. ECON. LIT. 973 (2006).
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allocation of developing countries into new categories that will better
enable some generalization of tax policy advice.
Based on current literature, we tried to portray the conventional
wisdom in the field. There seems to be a general agreement that
consumption taxation is superior to income taxation in developing
countries in terms of both efficiency and redistribution but that
corporate income taxes should be withheld.
Moreover, according to conventional wisdom, developing
countries should tax as efficiently as possible and rely on the
expenditure policy to take care of inequality and poverty. But if that is
the advice, then why use consumption tax? Why not impose a head
tax, which is by definition even more efficient? The answer is that a
head tax plus an expenditure policy is not necessarily easier to
implement than income or consumption taxes. But, exactly how and
why is yet to be explored.
If the criterion for welfare is income, then there is no difference
between an income tax and an expenditure program, which is in fact a
negative income tax. If, on the other hand, we use other proxies for
ability, targeting individuals according to non-income characteristics,
there is a difference between expenditure policy and an income tax,
and the former could be easier to implement.
If we believe in universality (providing public and merit goods of
decent quality and possibly providing a cash or in-kind transfer to
everyone), expenditure policy could be much simpler and less
distortive than an income tax (as it imposes zero marginal tax rate).
The conventional wisdom is further challenged by Emran and
Stiglitz who argue that trade taxes may be superior to VAT. They
suggest that there is a need for empirical work that explicitly
incorporates the role of the informal economy to examine the
taxes to
question of whether the proposed move away from trade
136
domestic consumption taxes is welfare enhancing or not.
In addition, it is possible that the underlying explanation for a
whole set of policies exercised by developing countries is their desire
to cultivate a certain type of tax abiding firm. This hypothesis,
suggested by Gordon and Li, calls for a close examination of questions
such as who is taxed in developing countries and what information
flows from banks to tax authorities in developing countries.137 Lastly,
it is still an open question whether offering tax incentives to attract
foreign investments is warranted or not.
136

Emran & Stiglitz, supra note 9.

137

Gordon & Li, supra note 11.

